































Best Mode Disclosure in Canadian Patents 
David Vaver* 
But men may construe things after their fashion, 
Clean from the purpose of the things themselves. 
  - Shakespeare, Julius Caesar (I, iii) 
 
Abstract: A recent decision of the Federal Court of Canada, endorsed by the 
Federal Court of Appeal, holds that the duty under the Patent Act to provide 
in the patent specification the best mode of working the invention applies 
only to machines and no other class of invention.  This paper reviews the 
history of the best mode requirement, from its origin in the wording of 18th 
century British patent grants and its migration into late 18th U.S. and early 
19th century Canadian legislation, until the present time.  It is clear that 
Canadian law from the beginning has always required an invention’s best mode 
to be disclosed as a consequence of the statutory duty to correctly and fully 
describe the operation and use of every invention.  The later express inclusion 
of a best mode duty for machines does not impliedly exclude the same duty 
for all inventions. Contrary case law is therefore wrong and should be 
overruled. 
1. Introduction 
 Many newly minted patent agents are going into practice holding 
the belief that a Canadian patent application need disclose the best 
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mode of working an invention for only one class of invention: a machine.1  
If the application claims any other category of invention mentioned in 
section 2 of the Patent Act – any “art, process, … composition of matter, 
or manufacture”, or improvement thereof2 – the best mode of working or 
making that invention need not be disclosed.  
 This view would logically hold even where non-machine claims 
accompany a machine claim in the same application: the inventor may 
withhold the best mode of working everything connected to his invention, 
except whatever relates to the machine and its principle. 
 This paper argues that that the duty to disclose an invention’s best 
mode  in fact applies to all inventions.  The view that the duty is 
restricted to machines is wrong and should be overruled at the earliest 
opportunity. 
 Over 65 years ago Thorson P. said in Minerals Separation North 
American Corp. v. Noranda Mines Ltd. that 
the inventor must act uberrima fide and give all information known to him that 
will enable the invention to be carried out to its best effect as contemplated 
by him.3 
                                     
1 Thus, candidates for the 2010 Patent Agent Examination were expected to answer “no” to a question 
whether a specification claiming chemical compounds as the invention had to include the best method 
of making the compound: “there is no requirement [for an inventor] to describe his best method of 
making it. The ‘best mode’ requirement applies only to the application of a principle in respect of a 
machine, as set out in s. 27(3)(c) of the Patent Act, and not in respect of a compound” (Patent Agent 
Exam 2010 – Marking Guide B, Q. 13, at http://www.ic.gc.ca/eic/site/cipointernet-
internetopic.nsf/eng/wr02776.html#q13). 
2 R.S.C. 1985, c. P-4, s. 2, def. “invention”. 
3 Minerals Separation North American Corp. v. Noranda Mines Ltd., [1947] Ex. C.R. 306 at 317, rev’d 
on other grounds [1950] S.C.R. 36, aff’d (1952), 15 C.P.R. 133, 69 R.P.C. 81 (P.C.) 




 Thorson P.’s view on best mode – the “best effect” as he put it, or 
“preferred embodiment” as patent jargon sometimes has it – capped his 
statement of the main elements of the duty of disclosure imposed by the 
Patent Act. The entire statement has until very recently stood 
unchallenged by courts, practitioners, and the Patent Office alike as an 
authority applicable to all classes of invention.4  In dealing generally with 
the duty to disclose in 1981, the Supreme Court in the leading case of 
Consolboard Inc. v. MacMillan Bloedel (Sask.) Ltd.5 cited extracts from 
Thorson, calling him “an authority in these matters.” On best mode Fox’s 
standard text on patents accepted Thorson P.’s statement in saying that 
the Patent Act required an inventor “to describe correctly and fully what 
is his invention”, and that “necessarily involves the duty of disclosing the 
best method of so doing as contemplated by him.”6  In its turn the 
                                     
4 Ilsley Royal Commission on Patents, Copyright & Industrial Design, Report on Patents of Invention 
(Ottawa: Queen’s Printer, 1960) at 44-45 setting out Thorson P.’s entire statement and saying the 
Commission could not improve on it. Similarly I. Goldsmith, Patents of Invention (Agincourt, Ont.: 
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 The current Manual of Patent Office Practice is however confusing. At § 9.02.01 It cites 
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include a “full description of the best way of using or putting into operation [its] inventive idea” (Form 
24, para. (4)). 
5 [1981] 1 S.C.R. 504 at 524. 
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75; D. Vaver, Intellectual Property: Copyright, Patents, Trade-marks, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 
2011) at 343-44. 




Federal Court of Appeal in 1981 in Lido Industrial Products Ltd. v. 
Teledyne Industries Inc.7 accepted Fox’s view when asking whether or not 
the duty to disclose best mode had been broken in respect of a non-
machine patent, and held on the facts that it had not.  Had no duty 
existed at all, one would have expected the Court simply to say so 
instead of undertaking an irrelevant inquiry. 
 How then has the contrary view that best mode applies only to 
machines arisen?  Why is it wrong?  The rest of this paper is devoted to 
answering these questions. 
2. Restricting Best Mode: the Recent Decisions 
 In public policy terms, there is little reason why society should wish 
to grant an exclusive right in return for the disclosure of an inventor’s 
second- or third-best method of realizing an invention while letting him 
keep the best to himself as a trade secret.  The fact that no Canadian 
patent seems to have been invalidated solely for failing to disclose the 
invention’s best mode8 suggests the policy is working.  The practical 
difficulty of demonstrating that the method disclosed is not in fact the 
best then known to the inventor may also play a part but, given that the 
penalty for non-compliance is invalidation of the patent, concealment 
must be considered a high risk strategy for a duty with potentially low 
patentee costs and high public benefit. 
                                     
7 (1981), 57 C.P.R. (2d) 29 at 44-45 (Fed. C.A.) per Thurlow C.J. 
8 One however did come close: Di Fiore v. Tardi, [1952] Ex. C.R. 149 at 155-56 ultimately holding a 
patent invalid for insufficiency for more “important” reasons than the best mode failure in that case. 




 Non-compliance may also have effects beyond Canada since 
Canadian applications are often drafted in reliance on a corresponding 
United States application that traditionally has also needed to disclose an 
inventor’s best mode. But the United States has recently made best mode 
a mere talking point between the applicant and a U.S. patent examiner, 
instead of a ground of invalidation if the mode does not appear in the 
issued patent,9 and European law has long lacked a best mode 
requirement.  The U.S. change was supposedly partly premised on a wish 
to help unwary foreign inventors because, as a textbook coauthored by 
the current Chief Judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals baldly 
stated, “the United States is the only country with a best mode 
requirement”.10  Such assertions overlooked best mode requirements in 
Canada and Mexico as NAFTA partners, as well as in a number of 
Commonwealth nations (e.g. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, 
Kenya, Tanzania, Namibia, Australia and New Zealand) and other 
significant jurisdictions (e.g. Brazil, Mexico, Andean Pact members, Egypt 
and Thailand).  Best mode is also commonly recommended as the 
standard of disclosure for the patent laws of developing countries and is 
the default rule under the Patent Co-operation Treaty.11 Filers of 
                                     
9 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 282(3), as am. by America Invents Act, P.L. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011), § 15. 
 
10 M. Adelman, R. Rader & G. Klancnik, Patent Law (St Paul, MN: Thomson West, 2008) at 216; compare 
L. Petherbridge & J. Rantanen, “The Pseudo-Elimination of Best Mode: Worst Possible Choice?” 59 
U.C.L.A. L.Rev. Disc. 170 (2012) arguing that the new U.S. law helps ignorant foreign filers while 
disadvantaging U.S. inventors who will disclose best mode from habit, with J. Forstner, “International 
Implications of the U.S. Best Mode Requirement” 21 AIPLA Q’ly J. 157 at 165 (1993) claiming that little 
best mode litigation involves foreign applicants. 
11 UNCTAD, Development Dimensions of Intellectual Property in Indonesia: Access to Medicines, 
Transfer of Technology & Competion (N.Y. & Geneva: United Nations, 2011) at 28-29; D. Carlson, K. 
Przychodzen & P. Scamborova, “Patent Linchpin for the 21 st Century? – Best Mode Revisited” 87 Jo. 
Pat. & Tm. Off. Soc’y 89 (2005); B. Lu, “Best mode Disclosure for Patent Applications: An International 
& Comparative Perspective” (2011) 16 Jo. I.P.R. 409; Patent Co-operation Treaty, Rule 5.1(v) 




Canadian patents therefore still need to know whether they should 
include or dispense with such a disclosure in their application, or beef up 
the specification when preparing a draft based on an application from a 
jurisdiction with little or no best mode enforcement. 
 Since most patent law ultimately rests on interpretations of the 
Patent Act one naturally first turns there for answers.  Subsection 27(3) 
of the Act reads: 
The specification of an invention must 
(a) correctly and fully describe the invention and its operation or use as 
contemplated by the inventor; 
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of constructing, 
making, compounding or using a machine, manufacture or composition of matter, 
in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art or science to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely connected, to 
make, construct, compound or use it; 
(c) in the case of a machine, explain the principle of the machine and the best 
mode in which the inventor has contemplated the application of that principle; 
and 
(d) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the various 
steps, so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions. [emphasis added] 
 Paragraph (c) might suggest that one need disclose and explain the 
best mode of working an invention only for machines, and in 2009 the 
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Federal Court so ruled for the first time in Sanofi-Aventis Canada Inc. v. 
Apotex Inc.: 
Where Parliament has chosen to include a “best mode” obligation in respect of 
machine patents only, the courts must respect that choice. Accordingly, 
reading such a requirement into non-machine patents would be contrary to the 
principles of statutory interpretation.12 
Snider J. therefore held a patent for a medicinal compound need not 
disclose the best mode of making or applying it.13  The Federal Court of 
Appeal in one of the Viagra cases decided the following year specifically 
approved the above passage in Sanofi-Aventis.14 Snider J. herself recently 
reaffirmed her earlier ruling, rejecting an argument that claiming a 
number of medical compounds required the inventor to disclose which of 
them he thought best for the purpose.15  So Sanofi-Aventis and its 
progeny continue as precedents until they are overruled. 
 Two preliminary observations may be made on this development.  
First, apart from some reformatting and minor changes, subsection 27(3) 
has stayed the same since its enactment in 1935.16 One therefore wonders 
                                     
12 2009 FC 676 at para. 330. 
13 Snider J. also held that a best mode duty was anyway not breached because the best mode known at 
the Canadian filing date was unknown at the earlier filing date on which the Canadian application was 
based, and the latter was the relevant time to test for best mode compliance (ibid. at para. 331). 
14 Novopharm Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., [2012] 2 F.C.R. 69, 2010 FCA 242 at para. 72 (“Viagra”).  In 
reversing Viagra for other defects in the specification the Supreme Court of Canada said nothing about 
the FCA’s best mode ruling: Teva Canada Ltd. v. Pfizer Canada Inc., 2012 SCC 60. The Supreme Court’s 
ultimate decision on insufficiency has however been said to impose “a kind of best mode requirement”: 
N. Siebrasse, “Disclosure is the Quid Pro Quo” 
http://www.sufficientdescription.com/2012/11/disclosure-is-quid-pro-quo.html. 
15 Teva Canada Ltd. v. Novartis AG, 2013 FC 141 at para. 376.   
16 Patent Act, 1935, 25-26 Geo. V, c. 32, subs. 35(1).  




why, if the point taken in Sanofi-Aventis were good, it somehow escaped 
Fox and the highly litigious patent bar for some 70 years. Second, 
Parliament can and does do some pretty silly things but it is certainly 
entitled to a presumption against silliness in its legislation. One therefore 
also wonders why any legislature that believes in any form of best mode 
disclosure for patents would be so addle-pated as to limit its application 
to only one class of invention, and enigmatically of all those classes, 
machines.  Why, for example, given the enormous importance the 
Canadian Parliament has attached to health care patents for the best 
part of a century, would it decide that disclosing an inventor’s best mode 
of making or administering a medicine was not needed, while disclosing 
his best method of working a machine for making hairclips or paper cups 
was?  Yet it is precisely in the field of medicine that the federal courts 
have now decided that Parliament meant there to be no duty to disclose 
the best mode of making or using the invention. Snider J. said she 
thought the result was against “[c]ommon sense and fair play”17 but saw 
no way out.  Stulta lex, sed lex. 
 The research for this paper however strongly indicates that Thorson 
P. in Minerals Separation and Fox were right after all.  Sanofi-Aventis and 
its followers were wrong in: 
(a) not noticing that a proper interpretation of the duty in paragraph 
27(3)(a) to “correctly and fully describe the invention and its operation or 
                                     
17 Supra note 12 at para. 327. 




use as contemplated by the inventor” would include a duty to describe 
the inventor’s best mode of operating or using the invention;18 
(b) holding that the expression of a best-mode-for-machines duty in 
paragraph 27(3)(c) impliedly excludes a best mode duty for all other 
inventions;19  
(c) discounting the significance of Minerals Separation and Consolboard in 
interpreting subsection 27(3) and the best mode duty in paragraph 
27(3)(a). 
 It may seem extraordinary that legislation that aims to stimulate 
and protect advances in fields such as electronics and biotechnology can 
be best understood today only by returning to its forebears at a time 
when Watt was playing with steam and Volta with frogs.  Yet, as Holmes 
J. was fond of saying, “continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a 
necessity.”20 Many provisions in today’s Patent Act reflect the language 
and concepts of patent law and policy of late 18th century Britain and the 
                                     
18 Sanofi-Aventis omitted para. 27(3)(a) entirely when it set out subs. 27(3) (ibid. at para. 328). And 
while the Viagra court (supra note 14 at para. 13) did set out all of subs. 27(3), it referred to para. 
27(3)(a) only on another submission on disclosure (2010 FCA at para. 70).  On best mode it merely 
recorded the defendant’s submission (ibid. at para. 38, quoting Fox, supra note 4) and, after spending 
25 paragraphs on other matters, returned to best mode (ibid. at paras. 72ff.) without noting that para. 
27(3)(a) was critical on best mode too.  This oversight vitiates its decision too and entitles the FCA to 
overrule this part of Viagra: see R. v. George, [1966] S.C.R. 267 at 279 per Cartwright C.J. dissenting: 
“I do not suggest that … the Court of Appeal … was ignorant of the existence of [the relevant statutory 
provision] but …. I am satisfied that that section was not present to [its] mind when rendering 
judgment, although it does appear to have been dealt with in the argument of counsel”, following 
Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Co. Ltd., [1944] K.B. 718 at 728-29 (C.A.). 
19 See Bauer Nike Hockey Inc. v. Regan, 2001 FCT 1315 at [9]-[13] per Morneau Prothon., correctly 
interpreting the relationship between the two paragraphs and refusing to strike an allegation of 
invalidity based on a product patent’s failure to state the best known version of the product.  Neither 
Sanofi-Aventis (supra note 12) nor Viagra (supra note 14) cite this case. 
20 R. Posner, ed., The Essential Holmes: Selections from the Letters, Speeches, Judicial Opinions, and 
Other Writings of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1997) at 36 (letter to 
Harold Laski, Mar. 15 1917).!




United States, and early 19th century colonial Canada.  So it is with 
subsection 27(3), and paragraph 27(3)(a) in particular, of the current 
Patent Act of Canada.  Bedrock principles established for patent law over 
two centuries ago have remained constant despite the enormous 
intervening changes in the social, industrial and legal order. 
 Whether these principles continue to serve a useful function is 
however not the focus of this paper. Nor does it canvass whether 
legislation should modify the principles or whether courts correctly 
applied them in cases where they determined a best mode duty was 
present.  The concern is simply to establish that, until Parliament enacts 
otherwise, current Canadian legislation does require a best mode duty to 
be applied to all patented inventions. 
 The paper therefore starts by first examining the history of best 
mode flowing from paragraph 27(3)(a), starting with its forerunner in the 
British patent grant of the 18th century.  It then traces the adoption of 
the British law by comparable language in United States patent laws from 
1793, and by pre- and post-Confederation Canadian patent laws since 
1824.  These precursors of subsection 27(3) from the start were 
consistently considered to include a best mode duty for all inventions 
despite the addition in early U.S. and Canadian enactments of special 
provisions for machines, the paradigm invention that drove the Industrial 
Revolution during the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries.  The 
review of Canadian law, especially since 1923, confirms the continued 
presence of a general best mode duty for all inventions.  The paper 
concludes by indicating where Sanofi-Aventis went wrong and how 
subsection 27(3) is best interpreted. 




3. Best Mode Antecedents in British Law 
 In Britain, the link between best mode and the duty imposed by 
paragraph 27(3)(a) to “correctly and fully describe the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor” starts with the 
language of the British patent grant in use from the early 18th century.  
Because of the growing difficulty in discovering the nature of the 
invention from the often meagre description in the patent itself, the law 
officers who controlled the patenting process introduced into the 
document a proviso that rendered the patent void if the inventor did not  
particularly describe and ascertain the nature of his invention, and in what 
manner the same is to be performed.21  
 A separate document containing the inventor’s description had to 
be filed within a stated period of months in Chancery.  It came to be 
called a specification and was prefaced by language that recited the 
patent proviso.22 The proviso, which was treated as a covenant or promise 
by the patentee to the Crown, was later called by Lord Moulton a 
“condition [that] is the foundation of modern Patent law”23 and became a 
source for the “bargain” theory of patents so beloved of common law 
                                     
21 Webster’s Patent Cases (1844), vi (“Web. P.C.”); Bailey v. Roberton (1878), 3 App. Cas. 1055 at 1074 
aff’ing (1877), 4 S.C. 545 at 580 (Ct. Sess.); C. MacLeod, Inventing the Industrial Revolution: The 
English Patent System, 1660-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni. Press, 1988) at 48ff.; Report from the 
Select Committee on the Law relative to Patents for Invention (H.C., U.K., 12 June 1829) at 63. 
22 See the form of patent and specification set out in W. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law relating to 
Patent Privileges for the Sole Use of Inventions (London: Stevens, 1846) at 628 & 631 (patent) & 633 
(specification).  See also John Dolland’s specification of 1758 in 1 Carpmael’s Pat. Cas. 29; Richard 
Arkwright’s patent of 1776 in Anon., Trial of a Cause Instituted by Richard Arden to Repeal a Patent 
granted to Richard Arkwright (1785), 6-7 (patent), 8 (specification). 
23 British United Shoe Machinery Co. Ltd. v. A. Fussell & Sons Ltd. (1908), 25 R.P.C. 631 at 650 (C.A.) 
per Fletcher Moulton L.J.; see also Hindmarch, previous note at 70. 




courts to this day.24  The language of the proviso and the specification 
was interpreted in light of its evident purpose: (i) to teach and enable 
other workers to work the invention; (ii) to notify the public of what it 
was not allowed to do during the patent term (a function today served by 
claims); and (iii) to put the public in full possession of the invention once 
the patent expired so that those with relevant skills could work it as fully 
as the patentee could.25  
 The inventor’s duty under his patent and specification 
“particularly” to describe and ascertain his invention and how it 
performed amply supported not just the general duty to disclose, but also 
the particular duty to disclose the inventor’s best method of making and 
using the invention.26  Neither duty always went down well with 
inventors, who, while keen on having an exclusive right, were often less 
so about letting competitors in on all the inventor knew in return.  In 
1847 one judge noted that the common mode of drawing a specification 
was “to state, in some general language, what is the object of the 
invention, and to point attention to the subject matter in such a manner 
                                     
24 See, e.g., Teva, supra note 14 at paras. 32-35 & passim; compare D. Vaver, “Intellectual Property: Is 
it Still a ‘Bargain’”? (2012) 24 I.P.J. 143. 
25 Liardet v. Johnson (1778, K.B.) as reported in E. Hulme, “On the History of Patent Law in the 
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries” (1902) 18 L.Q.R. 280 at 284ff.; Arkwright v. Nightingale 
(1785), 1 Web. P.C. 60 at 61 (K.B.); R. v. Arkwright (1785), 1 Web. P.C. 64 at 66, 1 Carp. P.C. 53 at 76 
& 78-9, aff’d ibid. at 101 (K.B.) (machine patent); Turner v. Winter (1787), 1 Web. P.C. 77 at 81-82 
(K.B.) per Buller J. (dye-making patent); Select Committee Report, supra note 21 at 65 (evidence of 
Francis Abbott); Hindmarch, supra note 22 at 156; Oxford History of the Laws of England (Oxford: 
Oxford Uni. Press, 2010), vol. 13 at 950 (entry by W.R. Cornish). 
26 Hindmarch, ibid. at 155-56, 159 & 165-172; H. Lund, A Treatise on the Substantive Law relating to 
Letters Patent for Inventions (London: Sweet, 1851) at 100 & 121ff.; J. Collier, An Essay on the Law of 
Patents for New Inventions, 2nd ed. (London:  Longman & Rees, 1803) at 125ff.; W. Hands, The Law & 
Practice of Patents for Inventions (London: W. Clark & Sons, 1808) at 8 & 10; Select Committee 
Report, previous note at 63; J. Chitty, A Treatise of the Prerogatives of the Crown (London: 
Butterworth, 1820) at 182-3 & 186-87; British United Shoe, supra note 22 at 650. 




as to give as little information as possible”.27  An experienced patent 
lawyer was even more direct.  In giving evidence to a Select 
Parliamentary Committee in 1829, Benjamin Rotch said that in his 
experience: 
in three cases out of four, it is the main object of the patentee to deceive the 
public if he can, and nothing but the dread and fear of losing his patent 
altogether keeps him constantly from imposing on the public a false 
description…28 
 Lord Mansfield had nevertheless told inventors as far back as 1778 
that their specifications must teach a person skilled in the art to make 
the invention “and to make it as well as you by your directions.”29  What 
that meant in practice is well illustrated by an early 19th century 
infringement case in which a jury held a dye-making patent void for 
having an insufficient specification.  The dye could be produced well 
enough from what the specification disclosed but, for the presiding judge 
Gibbs C.J., well enough was not good enough.  He directed the jury that: 
[a] man who applies for a patent, and possesses a mode of carrying on that 
invention in the most beneficial manner, must disclose the means of producing 
it in equal perfection, and with as little expence [sic] and labour as it costs the 
inventor himself. The price that he pays for his patent is, that he will enable 
                                     
27 Barber v. Grace (1847), 1 Exch. 339 at 345 per Pollock C.B.  Pollock had been a law officer and 
leader of the patent bar and sat on many patent cases after appointment. 
28 Select Committee Report, supra note 21 at 107; see also ibid. at 44-45 (evidence of Arthur Aikin) & 
63 (evidence of Francis Abbott). Specifications were nevertheless practically difficult to access because 
they were randomly distributed uncatalogued among three offices that charged search fees even if the 
document was located elsewhere: Report & Minutes of Evidence before the House of Lords Select 
Committee on the Patent Amendment Bills (H.C., 4 July 1851) at 228-229. 
29 Liardet, supra note 25 at 285 and the other authorities cited in this note; D. Brennan, “The Evolution 
of English Patent Claims as Property Definers” [2005] I.P.Q. 361 at 369ff. 




the public, at the expiration of his privilege, to make it in the same way, and 
with the same advantages. If anything which gives an advantageous operation 
to the thing invented be concealed, the specification is void.30  
 It is true that the ground based on the wording of the patent 
proviso or specification sometimes overlapped with what a Lord 
Chancellor, charged with both sealing patents on the monarch’s behalf 
and also enforcing them in Chancery, called “a principle of patent law, 
that there must be the utmost good faith in the specification”.31  Any lie 
that misled the Crown, whether deliberately or innocently,32 was a 
ground to avoid the grant for false suggestion or misrepresentation.33  
This defect was more than a matter of merely calling a specification 
“insufficient”: a court could invalidate the patent on this ground of its 
own accord without the point even being pleaded.34  Gibbs C.J. himself 
based a failure of the best mode duty in his case on both grounds: a 
                                     
30 Wood v. Zimmer (1815), 1 Holt (N.P.) 58 at 60 (K.B.); similarly Bovill v. Moore (1816), 1 Carp. P.C. 
320 at 339-340 per Gibbs C.J., aff’d ibid. 348 (C.P.) (machine patent); Savory v. Price (11823), Ry. & 
Mood. 1 at 3 (K.B); Heath v. Unwin (1852), 12 C.B. 522 at 550 (Ex. Ch.) per Coleridge J. (diss.), rev’d 
(sub nom. Unwin v. Heath) (1855), 5 H.L.C. 505 at 542 per Pollock C.B. & 545-56 per Cranworth L.C. 
(process patent). 
31 Sturz v. De La Rue (1828), 5 Russ. 322 at 325 (L.C.) holding patent void (best mode was deliberately 
concealed on the inventor’s instructions: Select Committee Report, supra note 21 at 107). The good 
faith principle goes back earlier: see, e.g., Eldon L.C. who (when still C.J.) said that “patents were … 
to be judged of on the principle of keeping good faith, by making a fair disclosure of the invention”: 
Cartwright v. Amatt (1800, C.P.), noted in Select Committee Report, ibid. at 192. 
32 Bovill, supra note 30 at 348 per Gibbs C.J. 
33 Hindmarch, supra note 22 at 41-42 & 166-67; H. Fletcher Moulton, The Present Law & Practice 
Relating to Letters Patent for Inventions (London: Butterworth, 1913) at 98. 
34  Natural Colour Kinematograph Co. (in Liq.) v. Bioschemes Ltd. (1915), 32 R.P.C. 256 at 268-89 
(H.L.) per Lord Parker, followed in McPhar Engineering Co. of Canada Ltd. v. Sharpe Instruments Ltd. 
(1960), 35 C.P.R. 105 at 136-38 (Ex.) per Thorson P. in dealing with an allegation that a claim was 
ambiguous or obscure. 




“prejudicial concealment” and a “breach of the terms which the 
patentee makes with the public.”35 
 The grounds at common law and on the patent or specification were 
nevertheless independent, and the good faith requirement could equally 
flow from a purposive construction of the inventor’s duty to 
“particularly” describe the invention and its use. This ground based on 
the language of the patent or specification – literally, part of the bargain 
the patentee made with the Crown in exchange for the exclusive right – 
gave courts the clearest authority for invalidating a patent for non-
compliance.  Insufficiency as a defence was invariably raised by pleading 
that the plaintiff had not complied with the patent proviso.  The plaintiff 
then had to prove full and frank compliance or lose his case.36 
 The language of the patent proviso was moved into legislation in 
185237 and the proviso itself was eventually changed to allow for 
revocation on “any of the grounds from time to time by law 
prescribed”.38  Thus from 1852 on, the new statutory language became 
                                     
35 Wood, supra note 30 at 60.  The dual grounds of decision were apparently recognized by H. Fisher & 
R. Smart, Canadian Patent Law & Practice (Toronto:  Canada Law Book, 1914) at 78 & 198-9 referring 
to Wood in connection with the statutory provisions on both disclosure and concealment. 
36 Hornblower v. Boulton (1799), 8 T.R. 95 at 101 (K.B.); Morgan v. Seaward (1836), 1 Web. P.C. 170 at 
173-75 (K.B.); Walton v. Bateman (1842), 1 Web. P.C. 613 at 621-23 (C.P.); Tetley v. Easton (1852), 
Macrory’s Pat. Cas. 48 at 76 (Ex.); Heath (1852), supra note 30 at 523 & 550; Foxwell v. Bostock (1864) 
4 De G.J. & S. 313-14 (L.C.); Bailey, supra note 21 (1877) at 580; Clark v. Adie (1877), 2 App. Cas. 315 
at 333-34 & 340 (H.L.); Lund, supra note 26 at 100 & 121ff. For proof and pleading see Hindmarch, 
supra note 22 at 475ff., 669-70 & 675-76; T. Turner, The Law of Patents & Registration of Invention & 
Design in Manufacture (London: Crockford, 1851) at 38, 40-41 & 80; similarly on post-1852 pleading 
Bullen & Leake’s Precedents of Pleading, 7th ed. (London: Stevens & Sweet & Maxwell, 1915) at 804-06 
(although mixing statutory and common law grounds in the commentary).  
37 Patent Law Amendment Act, 1852, 15 & 16 Vict., c. 85, s. 9 (U.K.) requiring the filing of a complete 
specification “particularly describing and ascertaining the nature of the said invention, and in what 
manner the same is to be performed”. 
38 On later form of patents see Patent Rules, 1890, S.R. No. 950 (U.K.), Third Schedule, Form A. 




the main source of the best mode obligation, on which the former case 
law continued to be treated as authoritative.39  The requirement to 
disclose the inventor’s “best method” was made explicit in the patent 
statute of 1932 and remained so until the passage of the Patent Act 1977 
(U.K.), when it disappeared on the U.K.’s joining the European Patent 
Convention.40 
 The presence of an overlapping common law duty of honesty or 
good faith is no doubt the reason for the occasional loose remark that the 
general duty to disclose, and the specific duty to disclose best mode, are 
rules of the common law.41 But the duty to disclose the invention in a 
                                     
39 “It is expressly enacted that the patentee must, in the complete specification, describe the manner 
in which the invention is to be performed, and the description will not be sufficient unless it includes 
the best means known to him at the time of filing the document”: R. Frost, Law & Practice relating to 
Letters Patent for Inventions, 2nd ed. (London: Steven & Hayes 1898) at 205ff. on the same language 
carried into the Patents, Designs & Trade Marks Act, 1883 (U.K.), s. 5(4); similarly S. Brice The Law, 
Practice, & Procedure, relating to Patents, Designs, & Trade Marks (London: Clowes, 1885) at 11; J. 
Johnson, A Treatise on the Law & Practice of Patents for Invention, 6th ed. (London: Longmans, 
Stevens, 1890) at 100 & 121-24; W. Bewes, Copyright, Patents, Designs, Trade Marks (London: A. & C. 
Black) at 101-02; L. Edmunds, The Law & Practice of Letters Patent for Inventions, 2nd ed. (London: 
Stevens, 1897) at 156ff.; Fletcher Moulton, supra note 33 at 85 & 96; J. Roberts, The Grant & Validity 
of British Patents for Invention (London: John Murray (1903) at 72 & 74ff.; K. Swan, The Law & 
Commercial Usage of Patents, Designs & Trade Marks (London: Archibald Constable, 1908) at 45-46, 53 
& 59; D. Fulton, The Law & Practice relating to Patents & Designs, 4th ed. (London: Jordan, 1910) at 96 
& 99-100; Penn v. Bibby (1866), L.R. 2 Ch. App. 127 at 132 per Lord Chelmsford; Plimpton v. 
Malcolmson (1878), 3 Ch. D. 351 at 536, 580 & 582; British Dynamite Co. v. Krebs (1879), 13 R.P.C. 190 
at 192 (H.L.) per Cairns L.C. (referring to Act) & 195 & 196 per Lord Hatherley; Edison v. Woodhouse 
(1886) 32 Ch. D. 520 at 523; Siddell v. Vickers (1887), 39 Ch. D. 92 at 104 (C.A.), aff’d (1890), 15 App. 
Cas. 496 (H.L.); Pneumatic Tyre Co. v. East London Rubber Co. (1896), 14 R.P.C. 77 at 101 (Ch.), aff’d 
ibid. 573 (C.A.); British United Shoe, supra note 23 at 650; R.C.A. Photophone Ltd. v. Gaumont-British 
Picture Corp. (1936), 53 R.P.C. 167 at 195 (C.A.) per Romer L.J.  
40 Patents & Designs Act, 1932 (U.K.), s. 3; Patent Act, 1949 (U.K.), s. 32(1)(h); see Terrell on the Law 
of Patents, 12th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell 1971) at para. 226. 
41 See, e.g., in Canada, Fisher & Smart, supra note 35 at 198; De Forest Phonofilm of Canada Ltd. v. 
Famous Players Canada Corp., [1931] Ex. C.R. 27 at 43 per Maclean P. on predecessors of paras. 
27(3)(a) &(b) (“This was an obligation of the Common Law and it is now an obligation by Statute”); 
Fox, supra note 4 at 180 on best mode in para. 27(3)(a) (“At common law a patent was always held 
invalid … if he failed to communicate all his knowledge with respect to the invention”), as cited by 
Lido, supra note 7; Consolboard, supra note 5 at 518 per Dickson J. (changes to subs. 27(3) “merely 
gave statutory recognition to what had always been the common law”) [emphasis added throughout]. 




specification was not imposed by the common law, and so no “common 
law” of specifications or patent provisos ever existed in the way a judge-
made common law of contracts and torts did – any more than there has 
been a “common law” of obviousness, anticipation or patent 
infringement, despite the enormous body of case law on these concepts 
that nevertheless firmly rested on legislation or the words of the patent 
grant.42  As the old rules of pleading and evidence clearly recognized,43 
the duties of disclosure and best mode were best based on the language 
of the patent proviso and specification.  A decision on the meaning of a 
power or provision in a statute or deed does not become part of the 
“common law” just because a common law-trained judge delivers or 
deduces it, or common law principles are applied to interpret the 
instrument’s language or the consequences of non-compliance with its 
provisions.44 
 If a best mode duty can therefore be drawn from the proviso of the 
British patent grant it should equally flow from the language of paragraph 
27(3)(a) of the Canadian Act.  The principle of the proviso as interpreted 
by the British judges is equally that of the Canadian paragraph.  Although 
paraphrase is normally frowned on as a method of interpretation, 
exceptionally it works here, as the Supreme Court of Canada seems to 
have recognized in 1930 in equating compliance with the British patent 
                                     
42 Synthon B.V. v. SmithKline Beecham plc, [2006] 1 All E.R. 685, [2005] UKHL 59 at paras. 57-58 per 
Lord Walker, cited in part and approved in Apotex Inc. v.Sanofi-Synthelabo Canada Inc., [2008] 3 
S.C.R. 265, 2008 SCC 61 at para. 12 per Rothstein J. 
43  Hindmarch, supra note 22 at 475ff., 669-70 & 675-76. 
44 Whether a duty was based on common law or statute became important in Britain only after 1949 
when common law grounds could no longer be used to revoke a patent: Patent Act, 1949 (U.K.), s. 
32(1); American Cyanamid Co. v. Upjohn Co., [1970] 1 W.L.R. 1507 at 1510-11 (H.L.) per Lord Reid. 




proviso with compliance with another aspect of subsection 27(3).45  
Conceptually and functionally the Canadian duty to “correctly and fully 
describe the invention” is no different from the British duty to 
“particularly describe and ascertain the nature of his invention”; the 
Canadian duty to “correctly and fully describe [the invention’s] operation 
or use as contemplated by the inventor” must equally be the same as the 
duty undertaken by the inventor to “particularly describe and ascertain … 
in what manner the [invention] is to be performed”. 
 Nothing in the Canadian Act points to a different conclusion – 
including the presence of the best-mode-for-machines paragraph 
27(3)(c).  This becomes clear as we trace the importation of British law 
into American law, and the migration of the American provisions into the 
forerunners of Canadian paragraphs 27(3)(a) and (c). 
 4. Best Mode in American Law 
 The first patent law of the United States in 1790 amounted to only 
one section although a longer and more expansive one than its inspiration 
in section 6 of the Statute against Monopolies of 1624,46 the only patent 
legislation Britain then had.  An inventor who successfully petitioned the 
government with the assertion of a “sufficiently useful and important” 
invention or discovery would receive a patent that “recit[ed] the 
allegations and suggestions of the said petition, and describ[ed] the said 
                                     
45 French’s Complex Ore Reduction Co. of Canada v. Electrolytic Zinc Process Co., [1930] S.C.R. 462 at 
476 per Rinfret J. citing from Lord Halsbury in British Ore Concentration Syndicate Ltd. v. Minerals 
Separation Ltd. (1909), 27 R.P.C. 33 at 47 (H.L.). 
46 21 Jac. 1, c. 3 (Eng.). 




invention or discovery clearly, truly and fully”.47  Inventors’ complaints 
and the administrative burden of dealing with and rejecting around half 
of the 120 petitions presented under the 1790 law caused a new statute 
to be enacted in 1793 that more clearly set out what paperwork was 
needed for registration.48  Not only did the inventor have to supply 
drawings, specimens and (on request) models, but by § 3 he also had to  
deliver a written description of his invention, and of the manner of using, or 
process of compounding the same, in such full, clear and exact terms, as to 
distinguish the same from all other things before known, and to enable any 
person skilled in the art or science, of which it is a branch, or with which it is 
most nearly connected, to make, compound, and use the same.  
This primary obligation was followed by one contained in a second 
sentence which imposed a more specific duty for machines.  The inventor 
had to disclose not just his best mode but “the several modes” of working 
his machine, thus: 
And in the case of any machine, he shall fully explain the principle, and the 
several modes in which he has contemplated the application of that principle 
or character, by which it may be distinguished from other inventions… 
 This several-modes duty was clearly additional to the one contained 
in the prior sentence.  The machine inventor was not absolved by the 
several-modes duty from delivering a “written description” of the 
machine and “the manner of using” it “in such full, clear and exact 
terms” etc.   
                                     
47 Patent Act, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (1790).  
48 Patent Act, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-323, § 1 (1793).  See O. Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-
American Intellectual Property (Harvard S.J.D. Dissert., 2005) at 414;  D. Maxey, “Samuel Hopkins, the 
Holder of the First U.S. Patent: A Study of Failure” 122 Penn. Mag. Hist. & Biog. 3 at 8 (1998). 




 Nearly two centuries later when examining the current Canadian 
version of § 3 of the 1793 U.S. Act, Dickson J. for the Supreme Court of 
Canada criticized it for not being “happily phrased” and giving “the 
impression of a mélange of ideas gathered at random rather than an 
attempt to enunciate, clearly and concisely, a governing principle or 
principles.”49  He thought the defect could be the result of multiple 
amendments over the years; but the problem plainly existed from the 
start.  Commentators on the 1793 Act noted it while more clearly 
discerning the provision’s pattern.  Thus Phillips in his 1837 treatise 
mentioned, in words reminiscent of Dickson J.’s “mélange of ideas” 
remark, how the 1793 requisites were “blended and intermixed” but 
emphasized the dominance of § 3’s opening language: “it is by observing 
the first of these requisitions” – i.e., the duty to deliver a written 
description in full, clear and exact terms – “that the latter are complied 
with”, and “what is said of one requisite, is, in many instances, equally 
applicable to another”.50 
 These provisions remained much the same when the U.S. Act was 
revised in 1836 to create a system of examination, except that the 
several-modes-for-machine provision in a renumbered § 6 became part of 
the earlier sentence, separated by a semi-colon rather than a period.51  
The change of punctuation indicated no change in meaning: the 
conjunction “and” indicated that the special duty for machines was 
                                     
49 Consolboard, supra note 5 at 518. 
50 W. Phillips, The Law of Patents for Inventions (Boston: American Stationers’ Co., 1837) at 237-38. 
51 Patent Act, ch. 357, 5 Stat. 117 (1836). 




additional to the duties for machines and other inventions expressed in 
the preceding language.   
 Machines were likely singled out for special treatment because they 
were the prototypical invention of the Industrial Revolution of the late 
18th and early 19th centuries, and petitions for their patenting under the 
1790 law may have been disproportionately unsatisfactory.52 The 
requirement that their several known modes of working – and not just 
their best mode – be fully explained was thought to add to what was 
required for other inventions by the good faith duty to describe any 
invention in “full, clear and exact terms”.53 
 What is clear is that if an inventor had several modes of working the 
machine’s principle, he could not avoid also saying which was or were his 
best.  Since that duty was not expressed in the machine provision, it 
could come only from the earlier language that required the invention 
and its manner of use to be described in such “full, clear and exact 
terms” as would enable a skilled worker to use it as well.54  In other 
words, this primary duty must have applied as fully to machines as it 
applied to other inventions. 
                                     
52 A. Pottage & B. Sherman, Figures of Invention: A History of Modern Patent Law (Oxford: Oxford Uni. 
Press, 2010) at 14 indicating that the machine was the “central case” for the development of specific 
rules for patents throughout the 19th century, and most U.S. patent litigation in the first part of the 
century “concerned mechanical devices”. 
53 Sargent v. Carter (1857), 21 F. Cas. 495 at 497 (C.C.D. Mass.) per Curtis J. saying of a patented 
machine that the inventor “describes two devices. If he was then possessed of a third, he was bound to 
describe that also”. 
54 J. Anderegg, “The Best Mode Requirement of 35 U.S.C. Section 112” 6 APLA Q’ly J. 219 at 220-21 
(1978) rests best mode on the statutory codification of the common law duty, stemming from § 6 in the 
1793 Act through later Acts, to tell the whole truth and not deceptively conceal anything “relative to 
his discovery”.  But the overlapping duty in §6 not to lie is conceptually distinct from the duty in §3 
fully to disclose: see text accompanying supra notes 30-36; Grant v. Raymond, 31 U.S. 218 at 247 
(1832). 




 We have until now assumed that the British approach of 
interpreting the language of the primary duty to include best mode was 
followed in the United States, and indeed it was.55  American lawyers 
understood that the disclosure section, like much else in the U.S. statute, 
was inspired by the old Statute against Monopolies of 1624 and the 
wording of the patent grant as interpreted by British case law, which by 
1793, and even more so by 1836, had established a best mode 
requirement for all inventions.  Thus, U.S. Supreme Court Justice Joseph 
Story, later hailed as “one of the architects of American patent law”,56 
wrote in a paper published in 1818: 
The patent acts of the United States are, in a great degree, founded on the 
principles and usages which have grown out of the [Statute against Monopolies] 
on the same subject. It may be useful, therefore, to collect together the cases 
which have been adjudged in England, with a view to illustrate the 
corresponding provisions of our laws.57 
Story proceeded to do just that by setting out the provisions of the 
Statute against Monopolies and the British patent proviso on 
specifications and discussing the English decisions, which he perceptively 
recognized as made “[u]pon the construction of the British patent act, 
taken in connection with the conditions inserted in the letters patent.”  
Among the decisions discussed were of course the English judgments on 
                                     
55 Magic Ruffle Co. v. Douglas, 16 F. Cas. 394 at 397 (C.C.S.D.N.Y., 1863) (article of manufacture). 
56 F. Prager, “The Influence of Mr. Justice Story on American Patent Law” 5 Am. Jo. Legal History 254 
(1961). 
 
57 J. Story, “Of the Patent Laws”, in 3 U.S. (Wheaton) Reps. (1818), Appendix (Note II), 13 (although 
anonymous, Story J.’s authorship is confirmed by his son: W. Story, ed., Life & Letters of Joseph Story 
(Boston: Little & Brown, 1851), vol. 1 at 303; see also Prager, previous note at 254, n. 1); see too E. 
Waterscheid, “The Early Evolution of the United States Patent Law: Antecedents (Part I)” 75 Jo. Pat. & 
Tm. Off. Soc’y 697 at 698-99 (1994) . 




best mode.58  The clear inference, acted on by Story J. in his many patent 
judgments, was that American law and practice should generally follow 
British law and practice in interpreting the U.S. statutes except where 
the latter took a different tack.   
 That too was the view of the leading treatise writers.  Phillips in his 
book on the 1793 Act included a section headed “The specification must 
direct how to make, and describe the best way known to the Inventor of 
making, the article”59 and discussed the British case law, including that 
dealing with machine inventions, with no hint that machines were 
somehow exempt from the duty in the United States.  In fact, Phillips 
thought § 3’s several-modes-for-machine provision was of so little 
importance that, after including it when setting out § 3 verbatim, he did 
not refer to it again in his treatise.   
 Curtis’s treatise on the 1836 Act is more explicit. In passages 
retained in all editions from 1849 to 1873, Curtis cited the relevant parts 
of § 6 of the 1836 Act and went on to approve the English cases, including 
Gibbs C.J.’s dye-making case,60 as exemplifying the inventor’s duty to 
describe the invention so that it could be practised from the specification 
alone:  
                                     
58 See Story J., ibid. at 13-14 & 20-21. Story J. repeated and applied these views in Pennock v. 
Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 at 18 (1829) (prior use); see too U.S. House of Representatives Comm. 
debate on Patents Bill of 1793, Annals of the Congress of the United States, vol. 3 at 853 (Jan. 30 
1793), by Mr Williamson (“the principles of the bill [were] an imitation of the Patent System of Great 
Britain”); Senate Report Accompanying Senate Bill No. 239, 24th Cong., 1st Sess. (April 28, 1836); 
Bracha, supra note 48 at 415-16.  Note that Hindmarch’s leading English patent treatise (1846), supra 
note 22, was reprinted and published the following year in the U.S. by McKinley & Lescure, Harrisburg, 
Pa., with an added Appendix of current U.S. patent statutes and notes of U.S. patent cases. 
  
59 Phillips, supra note 50 at 282. 
60 Wood, supra note 30. 




the patentee is bound to give the most advantageous mode known to him, and 
any circumstance conducive to the advantageous operation; otherwise he does 
not pay the price for his monopoly, because he does not give the public the 
benefit of all that he knows himself. … [I]t is necessary that a specification 
should … give the best process, materials, and methods, known to the 
inventor…”61 
 After citing the several-modes-for-machine sentence, he made it 
plain that the duty to disclose several modes was in addition to the 
primary duty to disclose the machine’s best mode: 
[H]e is to state not only the peculiar device or construction which he deems 
best for producing the new effect exhibited in his machine, but also all the 
other modes of producing the same effect, which he means to claim as being 
substantially applications of the same principle.62 
 Two cases under the 1836 Act on machine improvement patents 
bear Curtis out.  The first claimed improvements to a cotton gin that left 
greater spaces between the machine’s ribs to avoid clogging, and then 
gave three ways to achieve that spacing.  Story J. said the inventor need 
not specify further how the three ways could be implemented: it sufficed 
“for him to state the modes which he contemplates to be best.”63   
 The second case also involved a machine patent, an improved 
portable sawmill, and the judge drew no distinction between machine 
and other inventions in his direction to the jury: 
                                     
61 G.T. Curtis, A Treatise on the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions in the U.S.A. (Boston: Little & 
Brown, 1849) at 166 & 170. 
62 Ibid. at 148-49.  
63 Carver v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 5 F. Cas. 235 at 238 (C.C.D. Mass. 1843). 




The patentee is bound to disclose in his specifications the best method of 
working his machine known to him at the time of his application. The 
specification is intended to teach the public the improvement patented; it 
must fully disclose the secret [and] must give the best mode known to the 
inventor…64 
 When a new Patent Act was enacted in 1870, it repeated the 
specification provision but the several-modes-for-machine sentence was 
now replaced by a best-mode-for-machine provision: 
and in case of a machine, he shall explain the principle thereof, and the best 
mode in which he has contemplated applying that principle  so as to distinguish 
it from other inventions…65 
 The purpose of the amendment was not to impose for the first time 
a best mode duty for machine patents.  On the contrary, it confirmed the 
holdings of prior case law that machine inventors were subject to that 
duty under the general provision to describe the invention and its use in 
“full, clear and exact terms”.  The amendment’s evident purpose was 
rather to remove the special duty on machine inventors to disclose not 
merely the best mode but also “the several modes” for working the 
machine invention.66 Machines were now put on a par with all the other 
sorts of significant inventions that were making their presence felt on the 
patents register.   
 In other words, after 1870 the best mode requirement continued as 
before for all inventions and, for the avoidance of doubt, machine 
                                     
64 Page v. Ferry, 18 F. Cas. 979 at 984 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1857). 
65 Patent Act, c. 230, 16 Stat. 198, § 26 (1870) [emphasis added]. 
66 Thus overruling Sargent, supra note 53. 




inventions too were made subject to that same duty.  No case law or text 
writer suggested that restricting machine inventors to a best mode duty 
somehow impliedly repealed the best mode duty for all other inventions.  
The best mode duty continued to be discussed and applied, including by 
the Patent Office,67 in terms that applied to all inventions without 
discrimination.68 
 The drafting anomaly was finally removed by Congress in its 
comprehensive revision of the U.S. Patent Act in 1952.  The best mode 
requirement was explicitly imposed on all inventions and the special 
machine provision was dropped as now “unnecessary.”69 
5. Best Mode in Canadian Law 
 The drafting anomaly the U.S. removed in 1952 remains in Canadian 
legislation despite the Ilsley Royal Commission’s recommendations in 
1960 to amend the Canadian Act in line with the U.S. reform.70  Canada’s 
                                     
67 See Patent Rule 35 under the 1870 Act in E.J. Stoddard, Annotated Rules of Practice in the United 
States Patent Office (Detroit: Drake, 1920) at 62-63: “The specification must set forth the precise 
invention for which a patent is solicited, and explain the principle thereof, and the best mode in which 
the applicant has contemplated applying that principle, in such manner as to distinguish it from other 
inventions” (emphasis added). 
68  Lorillard v. McDowell, 15 F. Cas. 893 (C.C.E.D. Mich. 1877) (product); Grier v. Castle, 17 F. Cas. 523 
at 524 (C.C.W.D. Pa. 1883) (product improvement); Anderegg, supra note 54 at 222; W. Simonds, A 
Summary of the Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (New York, N.Y: Strouse & Co., 1883) at 136-37 & 
W. Robinson, The Law of Patents for Useful Inventions (Boston: Little Brown, 1890), vol. 2 at §§ 484-86 
& 498 both applying the English case law to all inventions; similarly O. Bump, The Law of Patents, 
Trade-marks, Labels & Copy-Rights, 2d ed. (Baltimore: Cushings & Bailey, 1884) at 139; B.V. Abbott, 
The Patent Laws of All Nations (Washington, D.C.: Brodrix, 1886), vol. 2 at 68; W. Elfreth, Patents, 
Copyrights, & Trade-Marks (New York: Baker Voorhis, 1913) at 53-54; J. Waite, Patent Law (Princeton: 
Princeton Univ. Press, 1920) at 170. 
69 House Committee on the Judiciary, Proposed Revision & Amendment of the Patent Laws, Preliminary 
Draft, Notes, § 28 (U.S. Govt. Printing Off., 1950); Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006). 
70 Royal Commission, supra note 4 at 44-45 also setting out Thorson P.’s entire Minerals Separation 
statement on disclosure as indicating what a suggested redraft of the Patent Act meant to achieve. 
There is no suggestion that the redraft intended to change the law. 




current substantive legal position on best mode is nevertheless the same 
as that reached by U.S. law since 1870 and confirmed by the 1952 U.S. 
amendment.  Canadian statutes on best mode followed a similar path to 
the U.S. statutes, albeit sometimes with a significant time lag.  The only 
variation simply confirms a universal best mode duty. 
 In Consolboard the Supreme Court of Canada traced the history of 
patent specifications back to Canada’s first patent statute of 1869, based 
on the U.S. Patent Act of 1836.71 American influence however goes back 
well before Confederation to the first patent legislation of Lower and 
Upper Canada in 1824 and 1826 and the maritime colonies in the 1830s 
which drew heavily on the U.S. Patent Act of 1793.  The written 
description and separate several-modes-for-machine provision was taken 
by Lower and Upper Canada and Nova Scotia almost word for word.72 
Others like New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island in 1834 and 183773 
applied the requirement to “explain the principle and the several modes 
in which [the inventor has] contemplated the application of that principle 
or character” to all inventions,74 and Nova Scotia in 1851 also removed 
the “several modes” language from machines and required only the 
machine’s “principle to be explained”.75  The Province of Canada in 1859 
                                     
71 Supra note 5 at 518. 
72 An Act to promote the progress of useful arts in this Province, L.C. 1824, 5 Geo IV, c. 25; An Act to 
Encourage the Progress of Useful Arts within this Province, U.C. 1826, 7 Geo IV, c. 5, s. 3.  An Act for 
granting Patents for useful Inventions, S.N.S. 1833, c. 44, s. 7.  For a list of the amendments to the 
pre-Confederation statutes, see Fisher & Smart, supra note 35 at 2-3. 
73 An Act for granting patents for useful Inventions, R.S.P.E.I. 1837, 7 Will. IV, c. 21, s. 6. 
74 An Act for granting Patents for Useful Inventions, R.S.N.B. 1834, 26 Geo. 4 , c. 27, s. 6. 
75 Of Patents for Useful Inventions, R.S.N.S. 1851, c. 120, s. 7. 




just largely copied the 1836 U.S. Act including its several-modes-for-
machine clause.76   
 The Dominion of Canada’s first Patent Act in 1869 was also modeled 
on the 1836 U.S. Act with a few variations.  The specification’s 
description had to be in “full, clear and exact terms” and also had to 
“correctly and fully describe the mode or modes of operating 
contemplated by the applicant” for all inventions.  The redundancy of the 
1869 Act’s retention of a provision for machines that required a full 
explanation of “the several modes in which it is intended to apply and 
work out” the machine’s principle apparently went unnoticed.77 
 These provisions continued with minor stylistic variations through 
amendments and consolidations of Canada’s patent laws until the reforms 
of 1923; but the more things changed, the more things stayed the same.  
All the Canadian statutes since the 1820s were written against the 
backdrop of British and American treatises and case law, which were 
treated as authoritative in Canada.  Thus Fisher and Smart in their 1914 
treatise said the Canadian specification requirements were “in substance 
the same as in England and the United States, although differing 
somewhat in terms”.78  Those terms nonetheless included a duty imposed 
                                     
76 An Act respecting Patents for Inventions, C.S.C. 1859, 22 Vict., c. 34, s. 7 & subs. 7(2).  For the early 
history of U.S. and Canadian cross-border technology transfer and tensions, see R.T. Naylor, The 
History of Canadian Business 1867-1914, 2nd ed. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill- 
Queen’s Univ. Press, 2006), c. 10, “Patents, Foreign Technology, and Industrial Development”. 
77 An Act respecting Patents of Invention, S.C. 1869, 32-33 Vict., c. 11,  s. 14. 
78 Supra note 35 at 75; see also ibid. at 78 citing Turner, supra note 25, Sturz, supra note 31, & Wood, 
supra note 30, after noting both the statutory requirements of the then patent laws of the U.S. (1870) 
and the U.K. (1883); Smith Incubator Co. v. Seiling, [1937] S.C.R. 251 at 253-55 per Duff C.J. also 
indicating overlap between common law and statute; Emery v. Iredale (1861), 11 U.C.C.P. 106, 1861 
CarswellOnt 214 at paras. 20ff. noting the different respective wording of the English and Upper 




on inventors “in the public interest” to reveal “the best manner known to 
the inventor of performing” the invention as part of the “condition … that 
he has disclosed completely his invention”: so said the Supreme Court of 
Canada when reviewing “some long established and well understood 
principles of patent law”.79 
 Nobody doubted that, despite all the legislative tinkering, the 
statutory duty applied across the board to machines as much as to any 
other invention.  Thus Ridout in his 1894 treatise wrote that the inclusion 
of the several-modes-for-machine provision did not 
necessarily mean that all alternate modes of operation are to be illustrated and 
described, for there might be many; the best method of applying and working 
out the principle is the one to be described.80 
 A universal best mode duty was particularly important for Canada 
because of some special features of its early legislation that were not 
always present in American or British law.  First, Canada allowed patents 
to be used by the government without the patentee’s consent, although 
he was entitled to reasonable compensation as fixed by the Commissioner 
of Patents.81  Second, the Canadian Acts required early local working of 
                                                                                                                 
Canada patents but drawing no distinction between them and Britain’s and Upper Canada’s law on 
specifications. 
79 Western Electric Co., Inc. v. Baldwin International Radio of Canada, [1934] S.C.R. 570 at 571 & 573-
74 per Duff C.J. speaking of combination patents granted in 1915 and 1916 (one being reissued in 1921) 
and thus referring to the Patent Act, R.S. 1906, c. 61 with its several-modes-for-machine provision in 
subs. 13(3). 
80 J. Ridout, Treatise on the Patent Law of the Dominion of Canada (Toronto: Rowsell & 
Hutchison,1894) at 106 [emphasis added], on Patent Act, S.C. 1886, 35 Vic. c. 26, subs. 13(3), although 
failing to note that his view was contrary to the U.S. case of Sargent, supra note 53, which appears 
nowhere in his book.   
81 See, e.g., Patents Act, 1869, supra note 77, s. 21. 




patents by invalidating those which after 18 months relied on imports or 
after 2 years were not locally worked to meet public demand.82  This 
requirement, extending beyond machines to manufactures as well, was 
supplemented in 1903 by a system of compulsory licensing that allowed 
anyone to apply to the Commissioner of Patents to work the patent on 
terms fixed by the Commissioner, where the reasonable requirements of 
the public for the invention were not being met.83  These provisions 
applied across to the board to all patented products and processes as well 
as machines.  They were progressively eliminated over the course of the 
20th century, but while in force their purpose was evident: to make 
inventions quickly available to the Canadian public at a reasonable price 
or royalty and to ensure that “Canadian industry and Canadian labor 
should, in the shortest possible time, be made to profit by new 
inventions”.84   Those objects would have been seriously undermined if 
third party use could start only below the best mode the inventor had 
achieved when the patent had been applied for. 
 The general extent of the best mode duty was further reinforced by 
the patent reforms of 1923.   The Patent Act of that year eliminated the 
several-modes-for-machine provision but did not replace it with a best-
mode-for-machine provision as contained in the 1870 U.S. Act.  Instead 
the new Canadian Act just said:  
14.(1) The specification shall correctly and fully describe the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor. It shall set forth clearly the 
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83 An Act to amend the Patent Act, S.C. 1903, c. 46, 3 Edw. VII, s. 7. 
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various steps in a process, or the method of constructing, making or 
compounding, a machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.  
 The Parliamentary debates reveal an intention to keep Canadian 
patent applications in line with U.S. and British practice,85 no doubt 
because of the common traffic between Canada and those countries in 
corresponding patent applications.  The first sentence of subsection 14(1) 
is certainly consistent with that intention. It returns to the simple 
concept of the British patent grant and the prevailing interpretation of 
the pre-1870 U.S. specification statutes that deduced a universal best 
mode duty from comparable general language.    
 The presence of such a duty is also confirmed by the fact that three 
sections later Parliament introduced new provisions, inspired by recent 
British reforms, to limit patents over the critical areas of food, medicine 
and their ingredients.  If the substance intended for food or medicine was 
prepared or produced by a chemical process, only the substance as 
prepared by that process could be claimed.  Parliament must have meant 
these patents to be subject to the best mode provisions of subsection 
14(1).  Since everyone was free to make the food or medicine by a 
different non-infringing process, disclosing the best mode of the product 
and process would encourage others to find better ways of making food 
and medicine.86  The patents were also subject to compulsory licensing at 
a royalty fixed by the Commissioner of Patents with regard to  
                                     
85 Thus, on the Patent Bill’s second reading, a government amendment was put forward to subs. 14(2)  
to simplify the requirement for signing the drawings that accompanied specifications “to conform with 
the practice of Great Britain, the United States and other countries” (H.C. Debates, 14th Parl., 2d 
Sess., 13-14 Geo V, Vol. 3 at 2073 (1923) by Mr Robb).  
86 Dairy Foods Inc. v. Co-op. Agricole De Granby, [1976] 2 S.C.R. 651 at 663 per Dickson J. 




the desirability of making the food or medicine available to the public at the 
lowest price consistent with giving to the inventor due reward for the research 
leading to the invention.87 
The research leading to the invention would have included the best mode 
both of working the process and also achieving the best version of the 
food or medicine at the lowest price.  Requiring licensees to make 
inferior or costlier products by inferior or costlier methods, while paying 
a royalty based on the included cost of undisclosed best modes, would 
have frustrated this purpose. 
 The legislative debates on the next round of patent reforms of 1935 
do not reveal what, if anything, had broken that needed fixing.  Doubts 
may have arisen over the meaning of subsection 14(1) or pressure may 
have mounted to copy the U.S. law of 1870 to standardize the contents of 
specifications that were regularly being filed in both jurisdictions. In any 
event, having removed one tautology in 1923, the Patent Act of 193588 
introduced another by amending the specification provision again, this 
time to include an explicit best-mode-for-machine provision: 
35.(1) The applicant shall in the specification shall correctly and fully describe 
the invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor, and set 
forth clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of constructing, 
making, compounding, or using a machine, manufacture, or composition of 
matter, in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person 
skilled in the art or science to which it appertains, or with which it is most 
closely connected, to make, construct, compound or use it. In the case of a 
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machine he shall explain the principle thereof and the best mode in which he 
has contemplated the application of that principle. In the case of a process he 
shall explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the various steps, so as to 
distinguish the invention from other inventions. [Emphasis added] 
 The emphasized language is with immaterial grammatical changes 
taken verbatim from § 26 of the U.S. Patent Act 1870.  The whole 
subsection is essentially today’s subsection 27(3), except that the latter 
is divided into four paragraphs for ease of reading and reference. 
 Despite all the added verbiage the 1935 changes indicate no intent 
to change the law on best mode as it stood both before and after the 
1923 Act. By repeating the first sentence of the 1923 Act, the drafter 
must have intended to retain the 1923 Act’s universal best mode duty.  
He would equally have known that the addition of a best-mode-for-
machine duty would not affect the universal application of the best mode 
duty in Canada any more than it had in the United States when § 26 of 
the 1870 U.S. Act was enacted.  That was the result of Thorson P.’s 
Minerals Separation decision on best mode under the 1923 Act, a view 
that Thorson P. and other judges maintained under the 1935 and later 
Acts.89 
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 Any idea that the introduction of the best-mode-for-machine 
sentence impliedly repealed best mode for everything else is implausible.  
The food and medicine provisions introduced in 1923 remained in the 
1935 Act, and nothing indicates any Parliamentary intention then or since 
to reverse the 1923 policy of applying best mode to them, despite their 
later repeal and the introduction of different schemes to regulate access 
to patented medicines.  
 Nor is implied repeal suggested from anything in the 1870 U.S. Act.  
On the contrary, as noted earlier, the universal best mode duty was held 
by treatise writers, the U.S. Patent Office, and court opinion to continue 
under that Act despite the switch from the several-modes-for-machine 
provision to the best-mode-for-machine one.90  Parliament could no doubt 
have at any time copied the 1952 U.S. reform that explicitly made best 
mode universal.  Since a universal best mode duty was however already 
generally understood to continue as before in Canada after the 1935 
reforms, there was no pressure for yet further cosmetic tinkering merely 
to confirm that understanding. 
6. Sanofi-Aventis Revisited  
 The Federal Court of Appeal in Viagra endorsed Snider J.’s view in 
Sanofi-Aventis that Minerals Separation’s statement applying best mode 
universally was obiter, and that nothing in Minerals Separation or the 
                                                                                                                 
 Almecon Industries Ltd. v. Anchortek Ltd., 2001 FCT 1404 at paras. 57ff. per Gibson J., aff’d 
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Supreme Court’s Consolboard decision required best mode to be applied 
beyond machine inventions.91 
 The Court of Appeal is not bound to follow an Exchequer Court 
decision, and Consolboard is indeed obiter on best mode.   But the view 
that Minerals Separation was also obiter on best mode is incorrect, and 
Consolboard was far more relevant to her case than Snider J. seemed to 
realize. 
 (a) Minerals Separation and Consolboard Redux 
 Minerals Separation involved an allegation that a new process was 
not disclosed sufficiently to comply with what is now subsection 27(3)(a) – 
the 1923 version of the Act which lacked subsection 27(3)(c), the best-
mode-for-machine provision.  Thorson P. made clear that, while his 
statement of principle was based on decisions of prior Canadian and 
English courts, he was in fact interpreting paragraph 27(3)(a). The 
sentence in his judgment that  
the inventor must act uberrima fide and give all information known to him that 
will enable the invention to be carried out to its best effect as contemplated 
by him 
was followed by another indicating that the preceding statement referred 
to  
the extent to which the disclosures must go in describing the invention and its 
operation or use as contemplated by the inventor, if the patent is not to fail 
for either the ambiguity or insufficiency of such description.92 
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The italicized words indicate his view of what the duty in paragraph 
27(3)(a), “to correctly and fully describe [the invention’s] operation or 
use as contemplated by the inventor”, requires – a view that the 
historical analysis above shows to be correct. 
 Although the point is somewhat obscured by his lengthy analysis of 
other defences, Thorson P. did consider whether his inventor had 
sufficiently disclosed the best mode of working the patented process of 
using a new but unclaimed substance (xanthates), and concluded that he 
had and that there was “no lack of good faith”.93 Thorson P. then held: 
In my opinion, the inventor has correctly and fully described his invention in its 
various aspects so that any person skilled in the froth flotation art would know 
precisely what the inventor has found to be new and useful, primarily as his 
best invention the use of the xanthates he defined, and also, on the ores 
specified and within the limits stated, the use of the other substances 
specified.94 
He then rejected another best mode submission, that the specification 
did not disclose the best method of making xanthates: 
 It was contended that in the course of the tests at Anaconda, in which 
an acid circuit was used, the inventor had learned a better method of 
preparing xanthate for use in an acid circuit than that described in paragraph 8 
but had failed to disclose this useful knowledge. … [T]here are, I think, two 
answers to [this contention]. The first is that the inventor did not have to 
describe any method of preparing xanthate at all, since xanthate itself as a 
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new substance is not the subject of his invention. The second answer is that 
there was no real chemical difference, having regard to the ingredients used, 
between the method described in paragraph 8 and that used in the successful 
test at Anaconda. …95 
 Thorson P. went on to dismiss the whole case based on non-
disclosure under paragraph 27(3)(a).  On the best mode point under that 
paragraph, he said that the skilled reader was “directed to the use of the 
best substance without any need for experimentation and can then deal 
with the other substances found to be useful as he chooses under the 
conditions mentioned”.96 
 Minerals Separation is therefore a holding that the best mode and 
good faith duties exist for all inventions by virtue of paragraph 27(3)(a).  
Thorson P. did not apply the duty to the chemical compound because the 
compound was not claimed, but he did apply it to the chemical process, 
which was claimed.  Whether he was right or wrong in his application is 
irrelevant for present purposes, except to notice that neither a 
compound nor a process is of course a machine. 
 The Supreme Court in Consolboard approved another passage in 
Thorson P.’s judgment, requiring that  
when the period of monopoly has expired the public will be able, having only 
the specification, to make the same successful use of the invention as the 
inventor could at the time of his application.97   
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While Snider J. quoted this passage and relied on the words above that 
she emphasized,98 she could equally have emphasized the earlier part of 
the sentence.  For an insistence on a correct and full description, so that  
when the period of monopoly has expired the public will be able, having only 
the specification, to make the same successful use of the invention as the 
inventor could  
does indeed “import[..] a ‘best mode’ requirement”.  How else can the 
public make “the same successful use of the invention as the inventor 
could” if the inventor gave just some second-best option that he had 
moved on from by the time he filed his patent application?  That point 
has been the justification for a best mode duty since the 18th century.99 
 While Dickson J.’s statement is obiter because best mode was not 
in issue in Consolboard, there is obiter and obiter. The statement was 
not casually tossed out but was a part of a “wider circle of analysis which 
is obviously intended for guidance and which should be accepted as 
authoritative” unless good reason exists to ignore it.100 
 (b) “To Express A Is To Exclude B”: A Shaky Concept Re-
examined 
 The good reason for ignoring Consolboard must lie in Snider J.’s 
insistence that her job was statutory interpretation and presumably not 
the application of judicial comments that were inconsistent with it.  Thus 
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her quotation from Thorson P. and Dickson J. is followed by an extract 
from subsection 27(3) – omitting paragraph (a) – and the Supreme Court’s 
judgment in Apotex Inc. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo Inc.101 on the importance of 
sticking to the language of the Patent Act and not relying on judicial 
glosses.  Viagra too repeated this passage and stressed the “importance 
of fidelity to the Act”.102 
 It is true that the words “best mode” refer only to “a machine” in 
paragraph (c) and “best mode” does not appear in paragraph (a) at all.  
Snider J. did not direct her judgment to paragraph (a) but might still 
have reasoned that: 
[w]here Parliament has chosen to include a "best mode" obligation in respect of 
machine patents only, the courts must respect that choice. Accordingly, 
reading such a requirement into non-machine patents would be contrary to the 
principles of statutory interpretation.103 
 The unnamed “principles” of statutory interpretation presumably 
boil down to the concept that “to express A is to exclude B” or expressio 
unius est exclusio alterius in its ancient Latin form.  In rejecting 
Consolboard’s relevance,104 Snider J. failed to appreciate that 
Consolboard itself also dealt with the same “principle” not once but 
twice, accepting it in one instance but rejecting it in the other.  As will 
shortly be seen, the reasons for rejection suggest the Consolboard court 
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would also have rejected the idea that the expression of a special best 
mode duty for machines excluded a best mode duty for all other 
inventions. 
 The implied exclusion concept, often called a “maxim”, may be less 
a rule of law than a rule of language for it determines the meaning a text 
can have, not what it does have.105  The concept applies most often 
where the statute’s drafting is precise, coherent and consistent,106 when 
it tends to elevate itself into a “principle”, “canon” or even “rule”.  With 
less virtuous drafting it tends to stay a “maxim” or slides into 
“presumption” or mere “hint”.  At worst the concept becomes a banality 
that the spurious mystique of Latin otherwise obscures.107  One court 
called it the “weakest and least reliable” of “the hints or examples of 
common drafting practices”: “If I state that I have a pen, that does not 
imply that I have no pencil (nor ruler nor eraser)”,108 let alone that you 
do or do not have any or all of these implements.  In such contexts the 
“maxim” – like others of its ilk – has been called “shaky” and “often 
perilous”,109 one that “hardly ever plays a useful role” but instead is 
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107$Speaking of the volenti non fit injuria maxim, Lord Esher M.R. said “if we put this maxim into plain 
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“almost always a means of stating a conclusion.”110 For by expressing A, I 
may not mean to exclude B at all; indeed, I may be content to let A and B 
overlap and co-exist. 
 A quick review of decided cases that cite the implied exclusion 
concept indicates that it is disregarded at least as often as it is applied 
because the context in which it is invoked varies so widely.  A statute 
may be drafted precisely, coherently and consistently, or it may be 
imprecise, incoherent, inconsistent or all three in varying degrees.  The 
concept’s value will decrease as the material with which it has to work 
moves from the positive to the negative end of this spectrum. Such are 
the realities of legislation and why the concept is often “merely a guide 
to interpretation [that] does not pre-ordain conclusions”111 or apply 
where it “leads to inconsistency or injustice”.112  It must be clear that the 
express and tacit “cannot reasonably be intended to co-exist”,113 for one 
must “realize that a general rule of interpretation is not always in the 
mind of a draughtsman; that accidents occur; that there may be 
inadvertence; that sometimes unnecessary expressions are introduced, ex 
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abundanti cautela, by way of least resistance, to satisfy an insistent 
interest, without any thought of limiting the general provision.”114 
 A nice example of the concept working mischief is A.G. for Quebec 
v. Begin.115  One section of the Criminal Code provided that drunk driving 
causing death was manslaughter.  Another later-added section made 
impaired driving an offence and blood tests admissible if the accused had 
been warned before testing of their admissibility.  A person charged with 
manslaughter argued that his blood test was inadmissible because he had 
not been warned.  The application of the implied exclusion concept might 
make blood tests admissible only for impaired driving charges, and then 
only on prior warning.  The court that so held was reversed by the 
Supreme Court.  Blood tests had earlier been admitted without warnings 
in motor manslaughter cases, and the new impaired driving provisions 
demonstrated no intent to cut down admissibility elsewhere.  The Court’s 
quote from Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes is particularly apt: 
Provisions sometimes found in statutes enacting imperfectly or for particular 
cases only that which was already and more widely the law have occasionally 
furnished ground for the contention that an intention to alter the general law 
was to be inferred from the partial or limited enactment, resting on the 
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius. But that maxim is inapplicable in 
such cases. The only inference which a Court can draw from such superfluous 
provisions (which generally find a place in Acts to meet unfounded objections 
and idle doubts), is that the Legislature was either ignorant or unmindful of the 
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real state of the law, or that it acted under the influence of excessive 
caution.116 
 Maxwell’s words easily fit the case of paragraph 27(3)(a).  In 1923 
when subsection 27(3) had no explicit best-mode-for-machines provision, 
paragraph 27(3)(a) was universally accepted as including a best mode 
duty for all inventions. The addition in 1935 of a new best-mode-for-
machines paragraph – a “partial or limited enactment” – does not 
therefore imply an intention to “alter the general law” of a universal best 
mode duty.  The opposite inference is more plausible in a statute where 
precision, coherence and consistency are not conspicuously present: the 
“superfluous provision” of best-mode-for-machines likely occurred to 
“meet unfounded objections and idle doubts”.  Although Parliament was 
probably not “either ignorant or unmindful of the real state of the law”, 
it likely “acted under the influence of excessive caution.” 
 This explanation is entirely consistent with how Consolboard dealt 
with subsection 27(3).  Although, just as in Sanofi-Aventis, the implied 
exclusion concept was not mentioned by name, its influence was 
apparent in the decisions of both the lower courts and the Supreme 
Court.  
 Two of the points before the Supreme Court were whether the 
Federal Court of Appeal had rightly held that: 
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(i) the duty in paragraph 27(2)(d) – to explain the sequence of steps in a 
process “so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions” – did 
not apply to non-process inventions; and 
(ii) the duty in 27(3)(b) – to explain how the invention worked in terms 
understandable by “any person skilled in the [relevant] art or science” – 
did not apply to the duty (since repealed) in paragraph 27(3)(e),117 to 
“particularly indicate and distinctly claim the part, improvement or 
combination which he claims as his invention”. 
 The Supreme Court summarily agreed with the lower courts on point 
(i): the paragraph’s interpretation had been watered down to virtual non-
existence over the years and the Court plainly saw no need to reverse this 
trend and extend the provision beyond processes. In short, the implied 
exclusion concept applied.118 
 The Supreme Court however disagreed with the Court of Appeal on 
point (ii): the skilled person test in one paragraph was not excluded from 
another paragraph just because it was not restated there expressly.  The 
lower court had in effect wrongly applied the implied exclusion concept 
to reason that the requirement to disclose to a skilled person one 
paragraph implied that disclosure in another must be directed to a non-
skilled person, i.e., a member of the public at large.  That interpretation 
ran counter to a “well established principle” that specifications are 
addressed to workers skilled in the art: the adoption of “different 
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standards of disclosure for different parts” of the document was thus 
wrong.119   
 The Supreme Court therefore held that the expression of a “well 
established principle” in only one paragraph of subsection 27(3) does not 
necessarily imply its exclusion elsewhere.  The best mode standard is no 
less well established than the skilled worker standard in issue in 
Consolboard: both stem from and are indeed linked in two of the earliest 
18th century English cases on patent infringement and revocation,120 and 
both featured among the principles the Supreme Court in 1934 called 
“long established and well understood.”121  One may therefore surmise 
that the Consolboard Court would have been equally inclined to hold the 
best mode duty applicable to all inventions despite the Act’s mentioning 
it just for machines. Otherwise in a patent with separate claims for a 
“machine” and its output (a “manufacture”), “different standards of 
disclosure” would illogically exist “for different parts” of the 
specification: a duty to disclose the best mode for the machine but 
merely second- or third-best modes for the machine’s output. 
                                     
119 Ibid. at 521. 
120 Liardet, supra note 25 at 285 per Lord Mansfield (1778): “you must specify upon record your 
invention in such a way as shall teach an artist, when your term is out, to make it – and to make it as 
well as by your directions. … The inventor has the benefit during the term, and the public have the 
benefit after”; R. v. Arkwright, ibid. at 66 per Buller J. (1785): it is “clear law” that to be valid a 
specification must: (1)”put the public in possession of the secret in as ample and beneficial a way as 
the patentee himself uses it”, and (2) be “such that mechanical men of common understanding can 
comprehend it”.  Liardet’s patent was held valid and infringed, while Arkwright’s patent was revoked 
for its deliberately defective specification: see further Brennan, supra note 29 at 369-72. 
121 Western Electric, supra note 79 at 571, 573 (skilled worker) & 573-574 (best mode) per Duff C.J. for 
the Court. 




 Significantly, the Court’s discriminating exercise in interpretation 
occurred within a subsection that it called not “happily phrased”.122  We 
earlier noted a passage from Dickson J.’s judgment for the Court when 
reviewing the U.S. Patent Act of 1793.123  Snider J. did not mention this 
passage at all.  It is nevertheless worth quoting as it shows that Dickson 
J. fully recognized that his task was to interpret a provision that he 
called “the heart of the patent system”.  But the disclosure subsection 
was not the sort of precisely, coherently and consistently drawn provision 
where guides such as the implied exclusion concept could be routinely 
applied: 
It gives the impression of a mélange of ideas gathered at random rather than 
an attempt to enunciate, clearly and concisely, a governing principle or 
principles. This is perhaps understandable in that the section is the product of 
amendment over a period of many years. The language simply does not lend 
itself to a tight, literal interpretation. It is, and should be treated as, a 
parliamentary pronouncement, in general terms, of that which must be set 
forth by the applicant to the world before being qualified to receive the grant 
of monopoly under a patent.124 
And after leafing through the provision’s forerunners back to 1869 and 
the U.S. law of 1836, Dickson J. said of other additions made in 1935 to 
the disclosure subsection: 
It is not entirely clear what was intended to be achieved by the addition of the 
quoted words. They may have been added ex abundante cautela, seeking 
                                     
122 Consolboard, supra note 5 at 518. 
123 Text accompanying supra note 49. 
124 Consolboard, supra note 5 at 518. 




greater particularity of description, but they appear to be little more than 
pleonasm… It is not readily apparent that anything of substance was added in 
1935 to that which had been required since 1869.125 
 The addition of the best-mode-for-machines provision in 1935 
stands in the same position as the other provisions to which Dickson J. 
alluded.  If subsection 27(3) is approached with his words in mind, most 
things in it fall neatly into place.  Paragraph (a) would then be read, like 
the old British patent grant and U.S. law, to state duties that apply to all 
inventions.  Paragraphs (b), (c) and (d) then simply provide examples of 
the application of that primary duty, for caution’s sake or to avoid doubt. 
 On this reading, subsection 27(3) would be better understood if the 
italicized words below were added at the end of paragraph (a): 
(a) The specification of an invention must correctly and fully describe the 
invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor; and, in 
particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it must: 
(b) set out clearly the various steps in a process, or the method of constructing, 
making, compounding or using a machine, manufacture or composition of matter, 
in such full, clear, concise and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the 
art or science to which it pertains, or with which it is most closely connected, to 
make, construct, compound or use it; 
(c) in the case of a machine, explain the principle of the machine and the best 
mode in which the inventor has contemplated the application of that principle; 
and 
(d) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, if any, of the various 
steps, so as to distinguish the invention from other inventions.  
                                     
125 Ibid. at 519. 




 Modern convention would reformat the provisions as follows:  
(3) The specification of an invention must correctly and fully describe the 
invention and its operation or use as contemplated by the inventor; and, in 
particular, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, it must: 
(a) set out clearly the various steps in a process, etc… 
(b) in the case of a machine, explain the principle, etc….; and 
(c) in the case of a process, explain the necessary sequence, etc.  
7. Conclusion 
 The duty to disclose an invention’s best mode of working as part of 
the price of receiving a lengthy period of market exclusivity for an 
invention has been part of Canadian patent law from the beginning.  It is 
a modest enough obligation: 
Full disclosure creates few added transaction costs; eliminating it lessens the 
value of the public’s return for the grant of exclusivity and imposes additional 
costs on those who rely on the patent. Only what the inventor honestly 
believes, at the claim date, to be her best method of practising the invention 
need be disclosed and enabled.126 
 Whatever difficulties best mode compliance may have faced 
elsewhere, the record in Canada, so far as revealed by reported 
litigation, indicates a doctrine that has encouraged good practice and 
been sensibly applied – apart from the recent deviation in the case law, 
which, one hopes, will be soon overruled.  Whether or not Parliament 
retains a general best mode duty, subsection 27(3) could anyway do with 
                                     
126 Vaver, supra note 6 at 345. 




redrafting to overcome Dickson J.’s objection of its failure to enunciate 
its governing principles “concisely” and therefore “clearly”.127  
Meanwhile, even if subsection 27(3) currently still reads like an 18th 
century statute that is overly focused on machines, there is no duty nor 
necessity for its interpretation to create more anomalies than were 
present in its forbears in those less than best of times or modes. 
                                     
127 The Royal Commission’s Report on Patents, supra note 4 at 44, provided a helpful suggested redraft 
over 50 years ago. 
